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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE ERA of social consciousness which followed the business depression has
witnessed a revolutionary retailoring of the old commerce clause concepts,
developed under a philosophy of individual rights. The sweeping changes
occurring in each area of commerce clause application have progressed in
apparent disregard of contradictory developments in other related fields.
Social forces behind state police regulation have prompted an increasingly
narrow concept of interstate commerce in order to permit effective expansion
of state police power.2 Simultaneously, similar social forces have caused an
unprecedented broadening of the same concept in order to uphold federal
regulatory legislation.3
In addition to the logical feat of erecting two concurrent but contradictory
constructions of the commerce clause for police power purposes, the Court
has also been successful in establishing a third and even more isolated category 4
-the interpretation of the commerce clause in relation to state taxation of
industries which move their products across state lines. When property taxa-
tion was the backbone of the state fiscal system, the rule that no state could
place a burden on interstate commerce was not an imposing restriction. But
now that sales and related taxes,5 involving transactions that often reach
1. "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states." U. S. Co,,sT. Art. I, § 8, cI. 3. The silence of Congress on
the subject of the power of the states under this clause las generally been interpreted
to prohibit the regulation of such commerce by the states, and the exercise of both the
taxing and the police power has been held to constitute such regulation. Philadelphia
& So. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 695-696 (1895). But see Adams Mlfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. See Clyde Mallory Lines Y. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm., 296 U. S. 261
(1935); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441 (1937). But cf. Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U. S. 511 (1935).
3. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937), Comment (1937) 25 CALI.. L. Rmv 593. This case holds that the Federal Gov-
ernment has power to regulate where interstate commerce is "affected" by the opera-
tion regulated. See (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1221.
4. It has been repeatedly indicated by the Supreme Court that the areas open to
federal regulation and those where state taxation is permissible are not mutually exclu-
sive. See Stafford v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 495, 525 (1922); National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 35 (1937). But see Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 302 (1936).
5. Such taxes include a retail sales tax, a general sales tax, a gross receipts tax, a
gross income tax, and the various forms of compensating use taxes. See HAIG & Suoup,
ThE SALES TAx IN THE AMRICAN STATES (1934) 3-4; DEPARITE. Tr OF L msrT.V
RESEARCH AND DRAFTrIN (1932, Duke Univ.) pub. no. 1. Where the interstate sale of
goods is involved, the cases do not distinguish between excise taxes, license taxes, and
gross sales taxes but treat them all as privilege taxes, as opposed to property taxes.
GAVIT, Tim CoMxECE CLAUSE (1932) § 170.
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across state borders, have become indispensable sources of revenue,0 the
doctrine stands as a serious barrier to state fiscal policies. As a result, the
demand for change in the tax doctrines adhering to the commerce clause is
approaching a crescendo never before attained. Rumblings in the tax com-
partment of the commerce concept indicate that readjustment is already occur-
ring. It is the purpose of this Comment to point out some changes which have
been effected and others which may take place.
The orthodox rule has long been that any tax which burdens interstate
commerce directly is invalid, even though non-discriminatory, while a tax
which constitutes an indirect burden is constitutional only so long as it does
not discriminate in favor of intrastate commerce.8 Translated into terms of
actual cases, these concepts have fathered numerous refined distinctions be-
tween interstate and intrastate commerce and between direct and indirect
burdens. These distinctions seem founded upon dry legal logic rather than
any consideration of the practical effect of the taxes concerned. A privilege
tax measured by the gross receipts of a company engaged in interstate com-
merce has been held to impose a direct burden upon such commerce because
the tax "affects each transaction in proportion to its magnitude" and must he
paid "irrespective of whether profitable or not." But this criterion of prac-
tical effect has yielded to the press of legal dogma in the case of an ad valorem
property tax. Even though it likewise may cause the interstate merchant a
net loss, such a tax on property located within the state will be upheld, if
non-discriminatory, on the rationale that it constitutes an indirect and not a
direct burden on commerce.1 0 Moreover, taxes on gross income of an inter-
state business have been upheld when viewed as being in lieu of a property
tax which would otherwise be imposed by the taxing state or where there
is some fair method provided for apportioning the gross receipts to the con-
6. See State ex rel. Botkin v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 612, 251 N. W. 189, 197 (1933);
Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1934) 12 N. C. L.
REv. 99, 102-104.
7. See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887);
Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66, 69 (1923).
8. See Texas Transport & Term. Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U. S. 150, 155 (1924);
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 708, 711.
9. State ex rel. Botin v. Welsh, 61 S. D. 593, 251 N. W. 189 (1933); cf. Crew
Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292 (1917); see United States Glue Co. v. Oak
Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918). But cf. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145
U. S. 1 (1892). Gross receipts from the business of interstate transportation were at
first held to be taxable by the states. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall.
284 (U. S. 1872). But the Supreme Court soon overruled this decision and held such a
tax invalid under the commerce clause. Philadelphia & So. Steamship Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887). For a discussion of these cases, see Adams Mfg. Co. v,
Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 322-3 (1938). See also p. 284 et seq., in!ra.
10. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905) ; Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U. S. 1 (1933).
11. U. S. Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912); Pullman Co. v. Richard-
son, 261 U. S. 330 (1923).
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merce carried on within the taxing state.' And a tax on net income is valid
even though based upon receipts from interstate commerce.13
This disregard of practical effect also appears in those cases which turn on
the question of whether the tax-burdened activity is itself interstate commerce
or is only indirectly connected with it. In the so-called "drummer cases" a
license tax has been held invalid as a levy on interstate commerce itself when
exacted from salesmen soliciting orders for goods to be shipped into the
state only after acceptance of the orders by an out-of-state seller.14 On the
other hand, this same tax will be upheld when assessed against salesmen en-
gaged exclusively in vending goods shipped into the taxing state prior to
consummation of the sale. Though the ultimate burden on the transported
goods, in terms of added cost to the consumer, is the same in both cases, the
courts find application of the tax to the second situation to be only an indirect
levy on interstate commerce. 1 Even more unrealistic is the distinction drawn
by the Anerican Manufacturing case 0 between a tax levied on the privilege
of manufacturing and pne assessed against the privilege of selling. The former
is valid, being considered at most an indirect levy on commerce even though
it is measured by a percentage of both intrastate and interstate sales of the
goods produced.' 7 The latter, on the other hand, though measured in exactly
the same manner, is invalid, being said to constitute a direct levy on the very
privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.18
These decisions dearly indicate that the cloak of constitutional protection
thrown about interstate dealings is by no means impenetrable. Provided that
the statute is so worded as to fall within the protection of established legal
dogmas, the tax will be upheld despite any burden it may lay on interstate
12. Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (1891); see Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 256 (1938).
13. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918); cf. Peck & Co. v.
Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (1918) (federal tax on net income held to be only an indirect and
remote burden on foreign exports).
14. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507 (1906); Real Silk Mills v. Portland,
268 U. S. 325 (1925). In these cases the phraseology generally employed is that a state
may not tax the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. See Cooney v. Mountain
States Tel. Co., 294 U. S. 384, 392, n. 4 (1935).
15. Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1919).
16. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919).
17. It is regarded as a tax on a local privilege. See note 33, infra. Compensating use
taxes imposed upon the use within the taxing state of property purchased in interstate
commerce have been upheld as being taxes on the local privilege of using after the inter-
state transportation has ceased. See p. 286, infra. There is a doctrinal limitation that
the tax may not be imposed on the use of an instrumentality in interstate commerce.
Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245 (1929) (tax on the use of gasoline in a
ferryboat). But the Supreme Court has restricted this limitation in its more recent
decisions. Nashville, Chat. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933) (tax on stor-
age and withdrawal of gasoline); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S.
249 (1933) (use tax construed as tax on withdrawal from storage).
18. See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 297 (1917).
1938]
THE ]YALE LAW JOURNAL
commerce.' 9 Many states, however, have preferred the administrative sim-
plicity afforded by a sales tax to more ingenious statutes by which the inter-
state merchant could be reached. Clearly, application of interstate commerce
doctrine to a sales tax statute deprives the state of revenue otherwise obtain-
able from interstate merchants. Yet the chief objection to such application has
not been this loss of revenue 20 but rather the burden placed upon the local
merchant by permitting some of his competitors to go tax free.21 He is saddled
with the discriminatory burden of the tax in his struggle against out-of-state
competitors who sell through drummers or mail order catalogues. 22 A num-
ber of plans have been suggested to rectify this situation. These include a
federal sales tax on interstate sales,23 a Congressional statute granting per-
mission to the states to tax interstate sales, 24 and state compensating taxes
upon the use and consumption of articles which have not been exposed to the
state sales tax.25 Only the last of these devices has been put into actual oper-
ation, 20 and even its adoption is as yet very limited.27
Although dissatisfaction with the application of hoary interstate commerce
doctrines to increasingly prevalent sales taxation has not yet found expression
in Congressional action, it would seem to be reflected in the growing liberal
attitude of the Supreme Court. Adherence by the Court to Justice Holmes'
assertion that "interstate commerce must pay its way" 28 may be inferred from
19. "In plain economic fact the states can tax interstate commerce if they go about
it in the right way." Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controvcrsies over State
Taxation (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 773, 774.
20. Sales taxes have proved to be satisfactory answers to state budgetary needs in
times of emergency. See HAIG & Suoop, op. cit. supra note 5, at 37-38 and 100-101;
Baum, Legal Phases of Local Sales Tax (1936) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 28, 58.
21. This injury was the source of most of the discussion during the investigation
by Congress of this field in connection with a proposed statute allowing the state to tax
interstate sales. See note 22, infra. It has been unsuccessfully argued that, once a tax
has been held invalid as to interstate merchants, it is unreasonably discriminatory against
local merchants and so should be held invalid as to them also. See Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 499 (1887).
22. For an example see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Fry, 277 Mich. 260, 269 N. W.
166 (1936). See in general Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 8303, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; Gushman, The
Sales Tax and Interstate Commerce (1936) 2 OHio ST. L. J. 260, 265 et seq.
23. REPORT OF INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CONFLICTING TAXATION (1935) 64.
24. Such a bill, known as the Harrison Resolution, was passed by the Senate in 1934
with virtually no discussion. 78 CoNG. REc. 4597-4598 (1934). The bill died in the House
Committee. For discussion of the constitutionality of such a measure, see Lowndes, State
Taxation of Interstate Sales (1935) 7 Miss. L. J. 223; Perkins, loe. cit. supra note 0.
25. See (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 708; (1936) 9 So. CALIF. L. REv. 259. See note 17,
supra, and discussion at p. 286, i ra.
26. See notes 89, 90 and 91, infra.
27. There is a tremendous amount of administrative difficulty involved in locatiug
prorerty that is being used within the state but was purchased out-of-state or in inter-
state commerce. See Lowndes, supra. note 24, at 231 ; Perkins, supra note 6, at 106-107.
28. See New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. Tax Board, 280 U. S. 338, 351 (1930).
This demand was first voiced by Justice Clarke. See Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Richmond,
249 U. S. 252, 259 (1919).
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some relatively recent state tax power extensions developed through strained
manipulations of orthodox commerce clause doctrines. In the case of Utah
Power & Light Company v. Pfost29 the Court stretched logic to the breaking
point in order to uphold a state tax without doing violence to traditional
concepts. Idaho imposed a license tax on the generation of electrical energy
for barter, sale, or exchange and provided that the number of kilowatt hours
of electricity produced should be the measure of the tax.00 Much of the
petitioner's electricity was sold in neighboring states,3' but the court held that
no burden on interstate commerce resulted from application of the Idaho
tax to these sales. It reasoned that the power company was really engaged
in two operations-the conversion of water power into electrical energy, and
the transmission of that energy to consumers. The troublesome fact that con-
version and transmission are substantiall, instantaneous was dismissedl as
irrelevant since, when viewed from the "practical standpoint of taxation," the
transmission occurred after the generation was complete.3 2 Consequently, a
tax could be imposed upon the latter as a local operation without any direct
effect upon the subsequent interstate commerce.33
Judicious use of existing doctrine to favor state taxation of interstate com-
merce has not been limited to liberal determinations of what constitutes a local
activity. The original package doctrine 34 seems to have been facilely manip-
29. 286 U. S. 165 (1932).
30. Idaho Laws Extraordinary Sess. 1931, c. 3, § 1.
31. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 54 F. (2d) 803, 804 (S. D. Idaho 1931).
32. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 179 (1932). The lower federal
court went into an even more involved discussion on technical grounds to show that
generation and transmission were in fact separate operations. The decision emphasizes
the fact that a transformer had to be interposed before the electricity could be trans-
mitted over the system. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 54 F. (2d) 803, 805
(S. D. Idaho 1931). Compare Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm., 297
U. S. 650 (1936), where the Supreme Court invalidated a tax on the gross receipts from
radio broadcasting, refusing to hold that the broadcasting company was merely in the local
business of furnishing the station and the facilities while the customers who bought the
time did the broadcasting. For further discussion of this case see p. 283, infra.
33. For similar cases involving liberal interpretations of local activities, see East
Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 465 (1931); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v.
Henneford, 75 P. (2d) 1017 (Wash., Feb. 9, 193S). But cf. Texas Transport & Term.
Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U. S. 150 (1924); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax
Comm., 302 U. S. 90 (1937). Note also that in two very recent cases discussed below the
state taxes were upheld on the alternative ground that, broadly construed, the operation
subject to the tax was a local one. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S.
250 (1938) ; Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604 (1938). See
p. 282, infra.
34. This doctrine, as originally evolved by Chief Justice Marshall [Brown Y. Mary-
land, 12 'Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827)], was based partly on the commerce clause and partly
on the constitutional provision prohibiting a state from laying "imposts or duties on
imports or exports." See Sharp, M ,oement i Supreme Court Adjudication III (1933)
46 HARv. L. REv. 593, 605. See in general Jones, Some Constitulional Limitations on
State Sales Taxes (1936) 20 MIxx. L. Rcv. 461.
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ulated to achieve the same result. Though sales of imports from foreign
countries are immune from state taxation so long as the goods remain in the
original package, 35 like protection has been denied similar sales when the
goods were shipped into the taxing jurisdiction from a sister state.30 Thus in
permitting taxation of interstate sales of goods, the applicability of the original
package doctrine has been denied. Nevertheless, the original package concept
has been preserved as a convenient analogy to demonstrate when interstate
commerce comes to an end in the case of the transportation of natural gas.
Thus, an Ohio tax on the sale of gas to Ohio consumers" was held valid,
even though the gas had moved in interstate commerce, on the ground that
the change from the high-pressure transportation pipes to low-pressure dis-
tribution pipes was like the breaking of an original package so that the contents
might be treated, prepared for sale, and sold at retail.38 The distribution from
the low pressure pipes, therefore, was regarded as a local transaction which
Ohio was free to tax.39
In recent years the Court has not been satisfied with the scope of extension
of state taxation which could be achieved within the bounds of existing doc-
trines, and has subtly begun to undermine the very foundations of the restric-
tions formerly thought to be inherent in the commerce clause. Wiloll Cor-
poration v. Pennsylvania4 ° is the first of a series of cases to undertake such
an approach. A Pennsylvania tax on the distribution of gasoline measured
by the number of gallons sold 4 ' was upheld when applied to a sale by the
vendor's agents in Philadelphia for delivery in that city, despite the fact that
the gasoline was actually delivered from Wilmington, Delaware. Since the
vendor at the time of the contract did not own the gasoline required by the
agreement and could purchase it either from within or without Pennsylvania,
the Court ruled that the contract pertained to unascertained goods 42 and did
35. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218 (1933).
36. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506 (1923), (1924) 33 YALE L. 3. 321;
see Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 175 (1935).
37. OrIo GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1926) § 5483.
38. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 465, 470-471 (1931) ; cf. State Tax
Comm. v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U. S. 41 (1931).
39. Another example of the court's growing interest in the expansion of state taxing
power over interstate commerce may be seen in the recent history of the old case of
Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1 (1892). There a state income
tax measured by the number of commissions received, i.e., a gross receipts tax, was
upheld even though the taxpayer bringing suit was engaged wholly in interstate coin-
merce. The decision was so limited by subsequent cases that it has since been cited as
an example of a situation where the Supreme Court has overruled a former dedsion,
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 408, n. 2. (1932). It has recently re-
appeared, cited as good authority, in decisions expanding the taxing power of the states.
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 258 (1938) ; Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 75 P. (2d) 1017 (Wash., Feb. 9, 1938).
40. 294 U. S. 169 (1935).
41. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 72, § 2611d.
42. The orders specified a price per gallon "f. o. b. Wilmington, Del., plus 3c. tax,"
but the court construed this as being price-fixing only and not as an indication of the
[Vol. 48: 273
1938] THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 279
not "require or necessarily involve" interstate transportation.13 Consequently,
the commerce clause was said to afford no protection to the transaction. The
decision leaves unanswered many questions as to the existence of interstate
commerce. A particularly perplexing problem arises, for example, when the
contract itself does not call for interstate shipment 44 but the seller either owns
available sources of supply both within and without the state or else has the
choice of obtaining the goods by purchase from an in-state competitor or of
shipping from his own warehouse in another stateA01 At most, the [Viloil case
only points the way towards an enlargement of state power over interstate
commerce, and later cases in state courts have tended to limit its implications. 40
Its rationale has been held inapplicable to situations involving "special orders"
for particular goods, and courts have been lenient to the taxpayer in determin-
ing what constitutes a "special order." 47 Even though the Wiloil case does
restrict the definition of an interstate sale to some degree, its efficacy as an
aid in extending the scope of state taxation is questionable. The more specific
the judicial definition of an interstate sale, the more easily may astute counsel
mould transactions to fit that definition.48
source or place of shipment. Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 173 (1935).
See Varren & Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes:-Interstate Commerce Pays Its W1ay
(1938) 38 CoL. L. Rr v. 49, 57 c seq.
43. The forerunners of this decision are two cases dealing with the buying and sell-
ing of cotton for future delivery. Such contracts were usually speculative and did not
result in actual delivery. The Supreme Court held that even when they did result in
interstate delivery the seller was free to acquire the cotton in the market where the
delivery was made or elsewhere; hence the sales were not in interstate commerce. Ware
& Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405 (1908) (license tax on brokers dealing in
cotton futures); cf. Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U. S. 593 (1926) (federal juris-
diction question) ; Banker Bros. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210 (1911) semble.
44. The language in one part of the opinion may be interpreted to hold that inter-
state commerce may exist even though the contract does not require interstate shipment
so long as it is contemplated. See Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 169, 176
(1935). But cf. Warren & Schlesinger, supra note 42, at 59. Cf. Dahnke-Walker Mill-
ing Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282 (1921) (state police power); Lemke v. Farmers
Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (1922) (same).
45. But it must be noticed that, as the court points out, it was not shown that vwhen
the contract was made the appellant had any fuel of the kind covered in the contract or
that the fuel to be delivered was then in existence. Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294
U. S. 169, 173 (1935); cf. Compagnie General Transatlantique v. McGoldrick, 4 N. Y.
S. (2d) 661 (App. Div. 1st Dep't, May 27, 1938). See Johnson, State Sales Tax and the
Commerce Clause (1936) 24 CAuF. L. Rav. 155.
46. But cf. McNeel Marble Co. v. Graves, 247 App. Div. 242, 288 N. Y. Supp. 5S
(3d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 275 N. Y. 601, 11 N. E. (2d) 775 (1937) (per euriam decision).
47. National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, 276 N. Y. 208, 11 N. B. (2d) S31 (1937) ;
Williams v. Hamilton, 76 P. (2d) 1029 (Wash., Mar. 7, 1933); Felt & Tarant Mfg.
Co. v. Taylor, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 615 (App. Div. 1st Dep't, May 27, 193); Compagnie
General Transatlantique v. McGoldrick, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 661 (App. Div. 1st Dep't, May
27, 1938) ; cf. Simpson, Inc. v. O'Hara, 277 Mich. 55, 263 N. W. 809 (1936) ; Montgom-
ery Ward & Co. v. Fry, 277 Mich. 260, 269 N. NV. 166 (1936).
48. Cf. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390 (1930); Paramount Pictures
Distributing Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 376, 51 P. (2d) 335 (1935); Sheppard v.
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In the last term, the Supreme Court went still further and re-examined the
fundamental concept of a direct burden on interstate commerce, explaining its
past decisions in new terms. In prior cases the only criterion of a direct burden
was the vague rule that when the tax caused increased financial cost to ship-
ments in interstate commerce and the operation that was being taxed was an
integral part of an interstate transaction, the tax would be regarded as a
direct and therefore invalid burden on interstate commerce.4 ' In JJestern
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue 0 the Court propounded a more articulate
test for future use. The New Mexico statute involved levied a privilege tax
on the gross receipts from advertising of any person engaged in the publishing
business. 51 The appellant company sold space to out-of-state advertisers in a
journal which it published and circulated both within and without the taxing
state. The court held that the preparation, printing, and publishing of the
advertising matter was a local occupation5 2 and hence the tax was valid within
the rule of the American Manufacturing Company case. 3
Not content to base its opinion on this ground alone, the Court proceeded
to examine the situation in the light of "reason and the practical needs of a
tax system," interpreting such practical needs as embodying the double demand
that interstate commerce be made to pay its way but at the same time be
protected from the burden of cumulative exactions not similarly levied on
local business.54 This language suggests a new general rule to the effect that
a state may tax interstate commerce so long as the same transaction cannot
be similarly taxed by any other state. Thus the abhorrence of double taxation
which suddenly appeared during the last two decades in the Supreme Court's
treatment of state property and estate taxation , seems to have been bodily
imported into the sales tax field as a new interpretation of the commerce
clause. The approach is new, but the court finds little difficulty in explaining
previous decisions in its terms.
Musser, 127 Tex. 193, 92 S. W. (2d) 219 (1936); Williams v. Hamilton, 76 P. (2d)
1029 (Wash., March 7, 1938).
49. 1 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 374; GAVIT, THE CoWtrMEITFi CtLAtIs
(1932) §§ 167, 169; Comment (1938) 24 VA. L. REV. 301.
50. 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
51. New Mex. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 7, § 201 (I).
52. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 258-259 (Feb. 28,
1938). In pointing out that all of the events upon which the tax is conditioned occur in
New Mexico and not elsewhere, the court emphasized the fact that the tax is m'easured
by the advertising and not by receipts from subscriptions nor by the extent of the eirett-
lation of the magazine interstate. Id. at 260.
53. That is, it is a tax on a local privilege, the value of which is determined by gros
receipts from sales both interstate and intrastate. See note 16, sepra.
54. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 259 (1938).
55. See HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOTME (1933) c. II; Brown,
Multiple Taxation by the States (1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 407, 430, This development
has been very pronounced in the last ten years despite the fact that until then the Supreme
Court had clearly indicated that there was no rule of law, constitutional or otherwise,
preventing more than one state from taxing the same property or transfer. See HAm-
ING, supra, at 21, n. 55.
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In the past, application of commerce clause concepts to state taxation has
aroused protest by virtue of its exemption of interstate commerce from all
direct tax burden and not merely from that part of the tax burden which
discriminates against it. The Wcstcrn Live Stock case is of importance because
it suggests a method whereby this evil may be somewhat minimized. If some
doctrine may be invoked so as to expose interstate transactions to taxation in
a single state only, it can be argued that such taxation is valid despite the
fact that, by former standards, the exaction would be viewed as a direct burden
on interstate commerce. Such a doctrine may be erected on the foundation
provided by the due process prohibition against taxation of any transaction,
privilege, or property outside of the state's territorial jurisdiction.,
Application of this doctrine to interstate sales would present a ready oppor-
tunity to extend the scope of state sales taxation. Localization of a sale to a
particular jurisdiction for tax purposes would enable the Court to maintain
that a sales levy by that jurisdiction is unobjectionable, since a tax by any,
other state would be outlawed by the due process prohibition. Hence the levy
could not violate the new double taxation criterion of the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court has expressly indicated that it will not be concerned
with the "witty diversities of the law of sales" in reference to the passage of
title and other similar factors determinative of where the sale took place,", but
a reversal of this policy is not impossible.
The feasibility of such an argument may be seen by reference to a typical
fact situation with an individual vendor in one state selling through interstate
commerce to an individual buyer in a neighboring state. There are, to he sure,
two elements in the transaction which occur in separate states-shipment of
the goods, and their receipt; and it is quite likely that under existing precedent
a tax on each by the respective state in which it takes place would be held
to constitute a multiple tax burden within the prohibition of the Vestern Live
Stock case. But it is apparent that there is only one sale and that it is and
can be located, as a matter of sales law, in only one of the taxing states. Hence
it would not seem illogical to conclude that any attempt to tax it on the part
of the other state should be condemned as extraterritorial taxation and con-
trary to the due process clause. The development of a set of rules such as this
would call for repeated excursions into the highest reaches of legal theology.
but the courts have not hesitated to explore the conceptual possibilities of
similar situations in determining the location of intangible property for the
purposes of property taxation 8 or in deciding where the transfer of a de-
56. See HAIG & SHOUP, op. cit. supra note 5. at 643 et seq.; Lowndes, Spurious Con-
ceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation (1934) 47 H.nv. L. REV. 623, 630 et soe.
57. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512 (1906). See G.kvir, THE COMMEZiCuzc
CGL.us (1932) 122. For a case where a state court did look into the question of the
locality of the sale, see Simpson, Inc. v. O'Hara, 277 -Mich. 55, 26 N. A'. 809 (193 6).
58. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
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cedent's estate actually occurred. 9 At present, neither the vendor state nor
the purchaser state may tax an interstate sale. A judicious application of the
due process doctrine to such a transaction would allow one of the two states
to impose a direct tax thereon without contravening the anti-double tax policy
of the Western Live Stock case. The potentialities of this rationale as an
expander of the state taxing power are somewhat endangered by the possibility
that clever counsel could arrange transactions so that title and control would
pass in the states devoid of sales levies.0 ° This danger, however, is minimized
by the presence of sales tax statutes in twenty-sLx states and several munici-
palities, 61 and the probability that other jurisdictions soon will resort to this
method of taxation.
In addition, it must be emphasized that the Western Live Stock case cannot
definitely be said to have established multiple taxation as the sole criterion
of a direct burden. The outcome of this case, and of the subsequent Supreme
Court case of Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Company 2 which
follows its rationale, is based on the alternative ground that the privilege
taxed involves a local operation and therefore the tax imposes only an indirect
burden on the interstate commerce that succeeds that operation. 3 As a result,
there is a very real danger that the possibility of multiple taxation may not
be construed in the future as being the sole criterion of validity under the
commerce clause but as complementary to the tests already in existence, If so,
a state tax which cannot be duplicated in another state, either for practical
reasons or because of the operation of the due process clause, may still be
held invalid Because it is a direct burden on interstate commerce as defined
in previous Supreme Court decisions. While this danger is indeed present,
it is minimized by a realization that the Court's attitude towards state taxation
in this field, as reflected in these two opinions, is one of growing tolerance.0 4
59. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925) ; Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S.
1 (1928). See Rodell, A Printer on Interstate Taxation (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1166,
These decisions as to jurisdiction for tax purposes have been rationalized on various
grounds. See HARDING, op. cit. supra note 55, §§ 4, 5, and 6; Lowndes, supra note 56,
at 638.
60. See note 48, supra.
61. (1937) C. C. H. Sales Tax Laws, Western States; (1937) C. C. H. Sales Tax
Laws, Eastern States.
62. 303 U. S. 604 (1938).
63. Id. at 612, 613; Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 258
(1938). See note 33, supra.
64. Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (March 7, 1938) is a
third decision in the last term which expands state taxing power. There the Supreme
Court expressly overruled its decision which denied to the states the right to tax the
income derived by a lessee of the federal government from his oil and gas leases. The
court indicated that federal immunity from state taxation would be enforced only when
the interference with the functions of the federal government was more substantial than
in the case of a private person invoking immunity because he is operating under a gov-
ernment contract or lease. By analogy this decision has been held to indicate that a
state tax does not directly burden interstate commerce unless it too interferes very sub-
[Vol. 48: 273
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The only subsequent lower federal court decision involving these issues
refers to the above cases as a significant expansion of the taxing area of the
states.
66
If the Western Live Stock doctrine be construed to be tie sole criterion
of a direct burden on interstate commerce, then in the final analysis the ex-
pansion achieved depends upon the extent of future limitations on what con-
stitutes a possibility of multiple taxation. The Western Live Stock case itself
suggests too broad limits for the determination of such a possibility. An
earlier decision had held invalid a state occupation tax measured by the gross
receipts from broadcasting of in-state radio stations. 7 The Court explained
this decision in terms of its new standard by pointing out that a tax, such as
that in force in England, 68 might be levied by another state upon reception,
with the result of multiple taxation.60 This application of the test seems highly
rigid and may be explained as an attempt to reconcile a past decision rather
than to decide anew on a fresh set of facts. Broadcasting and reception are
sufficiently distinct operations to make it questionable whether taxation of the
latter by another state would be held to be multiple taxation should the
case arise again. Indeed, the distinction in substance between this case
and the Western Live Stock case itself seems slight. Like the printing and
publishing of the advertising taxed in the latter,70 broadcasting would seem
to be an operation local to the taxing state, although the gross receipts from
the operations in both cases are increased in amount by virtue of the fact
that these activities reach out to people in other states.7 ' The subsequently
decided Coverdale case represents a more liberal stand on the subject of the
possibility of multiple taxation. The tax there in issue - was levied on the
privilege of producing electrical energy for consumption by the producer him-
stantially with such commerce. Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 23 F. Supp. 193 (N. D.
Cal., May 3, 1938).
65. Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 23 F. Supp. 193 (N. D. Cal., May 3, 1933).
66. Id. at 194 and 196. Indeed the court squarely reversed its previous decision on
the law [Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 20 F. Supp. 940 (N. D. Cal. 1937)] when it
refused to dismiss the bill seeking to enjoin collection of the tax in question. The court
seemed to feel that in the Coverdale and the Vestern Liv Stock cases the Supreme Court
virtually discarded all distinction between direct and indirect burdens and merely vent
through the motions of retaining the old forms. Id. at 196. See note 64, supri. But cf.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, 81 P. (2d) 786 (Wash. July 29, 1938) for a case
refusing to follow the lead of the Corbett case.
67. Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 650 (1936); cf.
City of Atlanta v. Southern Broadcasting Co., 184 Ga. 9, 190 S. E. 594 (1937).
68. Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1904, 4 Edw. 7, c. 24 as explained by 15 & 16 GEo. 5,
c. 67 (1925 & 1926). Such a tax was imposed by South Carolina but was held invalid
as a burden on interstate commerce. Station NVBT, Inc. v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671
(E. D. S. C. 1931).
69. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 260 (1938).
70. See note 52, supra.
71. But see the discussion of this case in note 32, supra.
72. LA. GEN. STAT. Axx. (Dart, 1932) § 8790.
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self, and was measured by the amount of horse-power of the generator so
employed. The taxpaying company maintained a pipe line for the interstate
transportation of natural gas which it produced, and used the tax-burdened
generator to furnish the power required to force the gas through the pipes in
interstate commerce. To the contention that multiple taxation might result
from a similar levy, by other states through which the pipe line passed, on
generators located within their borders, the court replied that such hypothetical
taxes would not burden the same activity either in form or substance.7 3 In
other words, plural taxation was made possible not by interstate commerce
operations, but by the repetition of a purely local activity within several
states. 4
In the subsequent decision of Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storcn,7 5
the Court found this approach inapplicable to a tax levied on gross income
derived from trades, businesses, or commerce. 70 The protesting taxpayer was
a corporation which maintained a factory and principal place of business
within the taxing state but sold most of its products to out-of-state and foreign
buyers. The tax was held invalid for the reason that it could be imposed by
any state in which the corporation transacted business.7 7 Had the tax been
on the privilege of manufacture, it would have been valid"8 since only one
state, the situs of the factory, can regulate a purely local activity. Unfortunately
there seems to be no way to localize the privilege of carrying on trade, business,
or commerce to any single jurisdiction.70 Such privileges, by definition, are
exercised in every state in which the taxpayer engages in remunerative activ-
ities. Validation of cumulative taxes on gross income by each state touched
by the transaction of an interstate taxpayer would raise those very tariff
barriers between states which the commerce clause was designed to prevent.8 0
73. Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 303 U. S. 604, 612, 613 (1938).
74. It may be strongly argued that a state tax on gross receipts from the business
of unloading out-of-state ships can be imposed by one state only and that a tax on gross
receipts from the business of loading them in another state is imposed on an entirely
different activity. See Texas Transport & Term. Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U. S, 150,
157 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Such a tax has recently been held invalid. Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm., 302 U. S. 90 (1937). But the force of this
decision seems already weakened by the holdings in the Covcrdale and Western Live
Stock cases.
75. 304 U. S. 307 (May 16, 1938), rev'g Storen v. Adams Mfg. Co., 7 N. E. (2d)
941 (Ind. 1937), (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1418, (1937) 13 IND. L. J. 178.
76. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 64-2601 et seq.
77. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311 (1938).
78. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919). See notes 16 and 17,
supra.
79. It is possible, of course, arbitrarily to select the state of domicile as the one state
entitled to tax the gross receipts of a corporation, but such a rule would have the undesir-
able result of denying to other states in which the corporation did business the power
to tax any of those receipts.
80. Perkins, supra note 6, at 104.
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Invalidation of such taxes need work no hardship on the state or its local
merchants. A gross receipts tax will be upheld if levied not on the total gross
income, but on the portion of that income which bears approximately the same
ratio to the total as that part of the commerce carried on within the state
bears to the total amount of commerce done.8 ' This restriction on gross receipts
taxation prevents the erection of tariff barriers, and at the same time permits
interstate commerce to be forced to pay its own way. Consequently, the Court's
position in this case, though it constitutes no advancement in the extension
of state taxation, should not be interpreted as inconsistent with attempts in
the Western Live Stock and Coverdale cases to devise methods of forcing
interstate commerce to pay its way under other types of sales taxes.
In a vigorous dissent to the decision of the Storen case it was argued that,
as applied to the appellant corporation, the tax in suit could not be duplicated
in other states. The contention was advanced that, while a tax might be
imposed by some outside state upon sales by the distributors of the appellant's
goods, this was not the type of multiplication of taxes which the Westcrn
Live Stock case meant to brand as unfair to interstate commerce. In this
situation, each tax would be by way of return for the protection offered by
the taxing state to the manufacturer in the one case, and to the distributor in
the other.8 2 Under such circumstances the sole requirement for the validity
of the two taxes should be that they be uniform and non-discriminatory in their
operation in each state.8 3 Such an interpretation is an obvious extension of
the doctrine of the Western Live Stock case, and, if accepted, would nullify
virtually all restrictions on the taxability of interstate commerce.
The dissenting justice made an even more direct attack upon the double
taxation standard on the ground that a state tax should not be stricken down
by the courts simply because of the possibility of the multiplication of tax
burdens.8 4 He would require proof in each case not merely that the inter-
state commerce involved might be taxed by several states but that it was in
fact so burdened. This suggestion would seem to import a more realistic
attitude into the problem and would have the advantage of cutting short all
speculation as to the degree of possibility required. The courts would then
be spared the problem of deciding, for example, whether a tax on gross receipts
of a radio station should be held unconstitutional, as mentioned abovefr'
because of the unlikely chance that a neighboring state might impose a tax
81. See note 12, supra.
82. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 330, 331 (May 16, 1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting). This protection rationale has long been used by the courts as determinative
of the power of each jurisdiction to impose a tax on a person, thing, or act. See H-,nD-
rxa, op. cit. supra note 55, § 4.
83. But the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such taxes must also avoid being
direct burdens on interstate commerce. See note 7, supra.
84. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 327-330 (May 16, 1938). Only Con-
gress, he suggested, has the power to formulate laws to protect interstate commerce
from "uerely possible future unfair burdens." Id. at 328 (italics are Justice Black's).
85. See p. 283, supra.
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upon reception at some time in the future.8 6 But if it were shown that two
such taxes were in force, a sale would still escape taxation in both states
unless the due process doctrine were invoked to limit the taxability of the
sale to a single state.8 7 Moreover, a further disadvantage would result from
requiring proof of actual multiple taxation. The state which imposed the
first tax could collect it without objection, whereas other states would find
the taxpayer levy-proof. The only alternative would be judicial acceptance
of the dissenting justice's protection argument s8 as a basis for differentiating
taxes by two states on the same interstate sale, and a consequent abolition of
all commerce clause restrictions on state taxation. The language of the Storen
and the Western Live Stock cases indicates clearly that the Supreme Court
at present will not give serious consideration to the stand advocated by this
dissent.
The problem of double taxation has previously been discussed to some
extent by the Supreme Court in connection with a Washington compensating
use tax. 0 This levy avoids multiple taxation by providing an exemption for
all articles whose sale or use has previously been subject to a tax equal to
or in excess of the instant tax, whether under Washington law or under the
law of any other state. 0 Not all states with similar taxes, however, provide
for an exemption for the taxes paid in another state.91 The question then
arises whether a sales tax in one state and a use tax on the same article in
another state constitute a multiple tax burden within the meaning of the
Western Live Stock case. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Company"2 the
Supreme Court upheld the Washington tax as a levy on the exercise of a
local privilege after the interstate movement of the property whose use was
being taxed had come to an end.93 It refused to view this as a tax upon the
foreign sale even though the tax was imposed upon the use of articles which
had been bought in another state and not upon the use of those which were
the subject of a gift or bequest. 4 While the court expressly avoided passing
86. But see note 68, supra.
87. See Lowndes, note 56 supra, at 638.
88. See note 82, supra.
89. Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, § 32(c). The exemption has since been reduced in
extent so as to include only those cases where the local sales tax has already been paid.
WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, Supp. 1937) § 8370-32.
90. See in general Warren & Schlesinger, supra note 42, at 69, et seq.; (1936) 9 So.
CALIF. L. REv. 259. 267.
91. In fact, most of the states with use statutes allow exemptions for local sales taxes
only. See Warren & Schlesinger, supra note 42, at 65, n. 73, 74 and 77.
92. 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
93. Cf. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1932). See note 17, supra, But
cf. Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935) (state police power case).
94. "One could argue with as much reason that there would be a tax upon the sale
if a property tax were limited to chattels so acquired. A legislature has a wide range of
choice in classifying and limiting the subjects of taxation." Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., 300 U. S. 577, 587 (1937). Thus, the legislature is free to make the tax base as
broad or narrow as it pleases. Id. at 588.
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on the multiple taxation question since it was not directly involved in the
case, it did suggest a possible argument for the validity of a compensating
use tax that allows exemptions only to the extent that the sales tax of the
same state has been paid. It pointed out that a state might be treated as a
self-contained unit which need not look to the taxing systems of other states
in fixing the exemptions which it will allow.05
The direct question has thus not yet arisen, but if the validity of the statute
providing for a use tax depends upon the presence of an exemption for foreign
sales taxes that have already been paid, this would be to some extent a repudia-
tion of the possibility of double taxation as the decisive test. There is always
the possibility that the exemption clause may be repealed by the legislature.
Instead, the determinative question would be that suggested by the dissent
in the Storen case-is there an actual burdenes On the other hand, if the
Supreme Court should hold that such an exemption provision is not necessary,
it would clearly be a departure from the stand against multiple taxation taken
in the Western Live Stock case. In the absence of such an exemption, a tax
on the use of articles that have been purchased from out-of-state sources
seems in fact to be a tax by the state of destination on the purchase itself,
while a tax in the state of origin would be a tax on the sale. A decision up-
holding the use tax under such circumstances would be a long step towards
the dissenting justice's other suggestion that the two operations be treated
as sufficiently differentiated to allow taxes by both states without constituting
double taxation.97 In view of the sentiment against double taxation exhibited
in the Western Live Stock case, however, it is probable that the Supreme
Court will in effect espouse the actual burden test by holding invalid those
use taxes which allow only the narrow exemption.0 s
CONCLUSION
As a result of the development of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the commerce clause, it is clear that the states can in fact tax interstate
commerce, but that their taxing statutes must be couched in careful language.
The most comprehensive state taxing system would provide for a tax on
the privilege of engaging in a local occupation measured by the gross receipts
therefrom. Provision would have to be made for the apportionment of these
receipts so that, in the case of a company doing interstate business, the tax
would be determined by the amount of that business done within the taxing
95. Id. at 587. In another part of the opinion, however, the court seems to lean
heavily on the fact that deductions are allowed for foreign sales taxes in deciding that
interstate commerce is not burdened by this general use tax. Id. at 581 and 584.
96. See note 84, supra.
97. See note 82, supra.
98. But before the Silas Mason case a tax on the storage for use of gasoline with
only a narrow exemption was held valid without discussion of the double taxation
question. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1932).
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